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The present work explores, from the vantage point of the sociotype, the dramatic 
acceleration of cultural change alongside the successive industrial revolutions, 
particularly in the ongoing information era. Developed within the genotype-
phenotype-sociotype conceptual triad, the sociotype means the average social 
environment that is adaptively demanded by the “social brain” of each individual. For 
there is a regularity of social interaction, centered on social bonding and talking time, 
which has been developed as an adaptive trait, evolutionarily rooted, related to the 
substantial size increase of human groups. A quantitative approach to the sociotype 
basic traits shows fundamental competitive interrelationships taking place within an 
overall “attention economy.” Approaching these figures via the Planckian Distribution 
Equation, they can be connected with many other competitive processes taking place 
in the biological, economic, and cultural realms. Concerning culture, the cognitive 
limits of the individual, which we consider commensurate with the sociotype general 
limitations, impose by themselves a strict boundary on the cultural items effectively 
handled by each individual, fostering the overall competition and decay. Further, the 
emergence of differentiated generations with ample discrepancy in styles of life, social 
aspirations, and dominant technologies would represent a systematic bias in the 
competition and replacement of cultural items. Intriguingly, the cultural acceleration 
detected in modern societies alongside the successive industrial revolutions, with an 
ostensible climax in the ongoing fourth industrial revolution –the information era– 
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1. Introduction: constancy of the “sociotype” versus acceleration of cultural change 
The main argument of the present work may be summarized as a paradox: that there 
is a constancy of our overall cognitive capability in relation with the external world, 
symbolized by and rooted in the “sociotype” limitations, that strongly conditions the 
dynamic processes of culture—underlying the general rhythms of maintenance, decay, 
and replacement of cultural items. 
First, what do we mean by the sociotype? Recently coined from two independent 
sources (Marijuán et al., 2017; see also Berry, 2011; Berry and De Geest, 2012), the 
sociotype means both the bonding structures of the social environment and the 
dynamics of social interactions to which the individuals of our species would be 
evolutionary adapted. So, the sociotype refers to the regularity of our predispositions 
to social engagement, to establish social bonds, to talk. Homo loquens could aptly refer 
to the most conspicuous trait we may observe in human societies: we endlessly talk. 
But, how much do we talk? And, with whom do we talk? A quantitative response to 
these two interrelated questions, rarely formulated together, was recently attempted 
in the quest to delineate the sociotype’s core values (Marijuán et al., 2019). In the 
same way that the central size of human groups seems to oscillate around figures of 
100-200 closely interrelated people (irrespective that other grouping sizes are also 
relevant, see Dunbar, 1996), the daily talking time would also oscillate around central 
figures, arguably of 3 – 8 hours (Mehl et al., 2007; Marijuán et al., 2019). The 
instinctive drive to talk on an almost regular basis would be useful to indirectly 
maintain the bonding relationships of the person and also to explore the possibility of 
new bonds. Social bonds (along the dimensions of family, friends, colleagues, and 
acquaintances) and talking time would appear as two different manifestations of the 
same unitary phenomenon: the sociotype (Marijuán et al., 2017). The sociotype 
captures the relative constancy of our species-typical social environment. 
Evolutionarily, it can be argued that the general limits of our sociality have contributed 
to establish, at the same time, the overall limits of our cognition. For the mostly social 
use of our memory-space becomes one of the basic cognitive reserves which can be 
partially diverted to other endeavors—as an instance, how reading occupies brain 
space previously devoted to the analysis of natural scenes in the environment and in 
social interactions is discussed by S. Dehaene (2009). The different contents we may 
attribute to culture would piggyback on the enormous combinatory possibilities 
inherent of our sociality, of our sociotype—which are regularly expressed via the 
combinatory capabilities of language and the instinctive drive to use it.  
As said, our main argument will be that this kind of shared relational/cognitive 
limitation, that we are symbolizing by the dynamic constancy of the sociotype, may 
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underlie the increasing acceleration of cultural change, so ostensible along the last two 
centuries. Our limited sociotype would act as a metronome, or better a ‘ratchet’, for 
the competition and replacement amongst cultural items and social customs. 
Importantly, a generational factor has to be considered, as it is via the aggregate 
interaction within generations that individuals promote – and suffer – cultural 
replacements and create new cultural equilibriums. Specifically during the last two 
centuries, the dynamics of creation, decay, and replacement of cultural items along 
the ensuing scientific and industrial revolutions has been steadily increasing, having 
reached a climax in the present information era. A series of economic data will be 
apportioned about that increase. A factor of capital importance along all historical 
epochs, and particularly in the present times, is the radical changes in the means of 
communication themselves. For many reasons, new media make possible the advent 
of the most profound cultural transformations (Hobart and Schiffman, 1998; Poe, 
2011).   
Several strands of thought will be interwoven in the present reflections: 
paleoanthropology, psychosociology, cultural philosophy, economic history, 
information science… All these heterogeneous strands should be brought together into 
a consistent thesis on the sociotype – and its intrinsic limitations – regarding cultural 
evolution and its acceleration along the successive industrial revolutions. That’s the 
main goal of the present paper. But it will be a difficult multidisciplinary construction. 
The point is whether this effort might help us make better sense of new-fangled 
cultural phenomena that surround these times of globalization and accelerated 
obsolescence.  
Along the sections which follow, we will discuss first, in some more depth, what we 
mean by the term sociotype and its evolutionary background, explaining its main 
contents and justifying its incorporation into the genotype-phenotype-sociotype 
conceptual triad (Section 2). We will be paying special attention to the different 
fieldwork data obtained on the quantitative sociotype (Marijuán et al., 2019). They will 
be approached (Section 3) by means of the “econophysics” of the Planckian 
Distribution Equation (PDE). From the sociotype point of view, it is like an invisible 
hand, an “attention economy”, that adaptively distributes the limited capabilities of 
social bonding and talking time of each individual within the social scenario, optimizing 
his/her aggregate fitness under the existing social constraints. Recent work on the 
decay of cultural items (Candia et al., 2019) and on the decay of scientific publications 
(Pan et al., 2018; Parolo et al, 2018) will be connected with this discussion, 
contributing to build a tentative link between the collective “attention economy” and 
the individual limitations on memory and cognition (Section 4). And in this regard, we 
will come across the influence of the generational phenomenon, paying special 
attention to the different cultural imprints that surround the emergence of each 
generation and the resulting bias in the social maintenance of cultural items (Section 
5). We will enter into a series of economic, technical, and scientific data that will 
buttress our main argument on the accelerating effects of the successive industrial 
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revolutions (Section 6). Then, the economic data of different countries and on a world 
scale will be examined with more detail, particularly looking for the growth trends 
during the last two centuries and discussing the ostensible consequences for the world 
of culture (Section 7). We will finally refer to the cultural inflationary dynamics of the 
Information Era and will argue about the unintended consequences of this Fourth 
Industrial Revolution (Section 8). And in the concluding comments section, we will 
summarize the fundamental points of our whole argumentation. 
 
2. Evolutionary background 
Sociality is an essential trait of the human species—as Aristotle put in The Politics, 
Book 1: “man is by nature a political animal.” Indeed a number of crucial novelties of 
our evolutionary and historical past revolve around the complexification of essential 
aspects of sociality: origins of language, emotional communication, in-group behavior, 
cooking and sharing of food, domestication of other species, cultural systems, morals 
and ethics, religious and legal codes, political institutions, knowledge accumulation, 
and so on (Diamond, 1998). So fluid and culturally diverse are the emerging structures 
of human sociality that, apparently, they defy any precise classification or quantitative 
specification. Traditionally, a number of schools of thought have followed culturally-
oriented approaches to this open ended phenomenon of human sociality (Mead, 1964; 
Derridá, 1976; Lévi-Strauss, 1981), while some others have emphasized views closer to 
biological determinism (Lorenz, 1965; Wilson, 1977; Barash, 1986). More recently, 
however, some evolutionary, anthropological, and social science approaches have 
achieved an interesting degree of convergence about fundamentals of human sociality 
(Chapais 2008, 2011; Tomasello, 2010, 2019; Henrich, 2016). In particular, hypotheses 
such as the “Social Brain” have contributed to advance a new brain/communication 
perspective on the evolutionary emergence of human sociality. Other related 
approaches such as the “Cultural Brain Hypothesis” (Henrich, 2016) or the “Cumulative 
Cultural Brain Hypothesis” (Muthukrishna et al., 2018) have provided further 
explanation on the singular evolutionary pathways, culturally centered, that have 
propelled the fast expansion of human brains and the many original aspects of our 
societies and our psychology—including our extraordinary ontogenetic learning 
capabilities (Tomasello, 2019). 
2.1. Brain size and group size: “bonds” 
Actually, the idea of relating brain size with the demands of communication in social 
life was already hinted by C. Darwin in “The Descent of Man” (1871). More than a 
century later, Whiten and Byrne (1988) reconsidered the idea and framed it as a social 
hypothesis. Known as the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, it was more rigorously 
formulated as the “social brain” by J. Allman (1999), R. Dunbar (1996, 2004) and 
others, extending it into different mental and biomedical fields (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1999; Badcock and Crespi 2008). Although the hypothesis has been criticized from 
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several grounds and cannot be extended to the generality of mammalian societies 
(Balter, 2012), nor can be neatly separated from ecological drivers (DeCasien et al., 
2017; González-Forero and Gardner, 2018), it attempts a cogent evolutionary 
explanation of natural groups and bonding structures in human societies. At the very 
least it has contributed to the popularization of the topic beyond scientific circles: the 
famous “Dunbar’s number” of 150-200 ‘friends’ (or maybe acquaintances) found in 
numerous media reports. Critics of Dunbar’s number (Read, 2012; Dezecache, 2012) 
have pointed out the lack of empirically well authenticated studies about that figure, 
as well as the strange ‘variance’ usually provided (±50). Killworth and Bernard have 
given estimates close to 300 individuals (Killworth et al., 1990) following a power law, 
and in (Marijuán et al., 2019) the average number of total contacts is about 100 
individuals, in this case following a Planckian distribution (a biexponential power law) 
that we will comment later on. In any extent, there seems to be emerging scientific 
consensus on an average of social networking, with very ample upper and lower limits, 
concerning the number and types of bonding relationships that an individual is able to 
maintain (Dunbar, 2004; Dunbar and Shultz, 2007; Fowler and Schreiber, 2008; Hill et 
al., 2011; Marijuán et al., 2017, 2019). And this ostensible limitation in the number of 
bonds, in the very extent of the sociotype, represents one of the basic tenets of the 
present approach. 
Herein the emphasis will be put, not only in the size of social groups, but also in the 
communication practices that underlie the formation and maintenance of the 
individual’s bonding networks—conversation. In itself, every interpersonal bond is but 
a “shared memory”, consisting in specialized neural engrams that encode a variable 
number of ad hoc behavioral episodes – most often linguistic exchanges – in between 
the concerned individuals, positively or negatively finalized according to their valence 
(Collins and Marijuán, 1997). Distinguishing several classes of bonds (related to their 
strength and valence) is important in order to assess the main categories, or better 
dimensions, within the relational sociotype of the individual—family, friends, 
colleagues, and acquaintances appear as the basic sociotype dimensions (Marijuán et 
al., 2017). Depending on their preferences and temporary circumstances, individuals 
will variably distribute among these categories their relational capabilities and bonding 
potential. In all these cases, rather than static collections of recognition events, social 
bonds become dynamic memory constructs ensconced upon complex synaptic 
engrams that occupy an important quota of cortical space, presumably with each 
bond’s occupancy depending on its specific contents, valence, and strength. That these 
bond engrams rely on vast cortical spaces would be in accordance with the relevant 
multi-area activations produced by social interactions and social evaluations, as 
observed in different neuroimaging studies (Greene, 2001; Iacoboni 2004; Caccioppo 
and Patrick, 2008). Our social interactions have also shaped our whole perception 
systems, particularly the visual (Abassi and Pappeo, 2020), as well as the auditory, 
tactile, etc. Overall, the cortical conformation and capacity of our species, vastly 
enlarged regarding other Anthropoidea (Allman, 1999), have made possible the really 
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high number of bonds, the substantial sociotype, which comparatively human 
individuals can meaningfully sustain and renew via communication practices.  
2.2. ‘Languaging’ as virtual grooming 
In many respects, language appears as the essential tool for bond-making in human 
societies, although not the only one (Benzon, 2001; Dessalles, 2007; Tomasello, 2010; 
Navarro et al., 2016). An important evolutionary aspect of language concerns its 
physiological effects on the practicing subjects. Could human language be a ‘virtual’ 
equivalent of the physical grooming of primates? It has been claimed that a variety of 
grooming practices (touching, scratching, tickling, chase playing, wrestling, massaging, 
etc.) are essential to maintain and restore the inter-individual bonds in primate groups 
and societies (Dunbar, 1996, 2004). The molecular cocktail involved in the grooming 
relationships activates the reward system in both groomer and groomee, with mutual 
effects in stress quenching, immune boosting, and learning consolidation, thus 
contributing to reinforce synaptic bond memories erased within the behavioral noise 
of those societies (Nelson and Geher, 2007; Shutt et al., 2007). Therefore, human 
‘languaging’ could have been evolutionarily co-opted as a virtual system for social 
grooming, subsequently stimulating in our “social brain” the production of 
neuropeptides and neurohormones that relieve stress and boost both immune system 
and nervous system function (Dunbar, 2004). In addition, the fraction of daily time 
devoted to this virtual grooming exercise (about 3 - 8 hours) looks congruent with 20-
25% of awake time for physical grooming in Anthropoidea. 
The repercussions in daily life cannot be overstated: talking becomes one of the 
preferred and most affordable types of mental stimulation. Counting with an 
appropriate network of relationships with people to talk with becomes a necessity for 
the individual. Having access to and participating in amusing conversations becomes 
an essential ingredient of our social, psychological, and physical wellbeing (Berkman, 
2009; Klinenberg, 2012; Holt-Lunstad, 2017). The contents exchanged are not of much 
importance. Seemingly, rather than the exchange of functional information, it is trivial 
conversation, gossiping about common social acquaintances which represents the 
human equivalent of primate grooming (Dunbar, 1996; Dessalles, 2007). And of further 
interest, the distribution of our talking times would also reflect its intrinsic competitive 
background within our attention economy. 
Taking into account the existing diversity of possible encounters (as well as the 
emergence of new communication channels), the daily conversation or communication 
budget of each individual has to be apportioned among the different bonding classes 
of his/her sociotype rather carefully, so that the talking exercise becomes sufficiently 
adaptive to ‘fit’ in the long term within the social niche around, and sufficiently 
rewarding in the short term, providing ‘grooming’ enough. There emerges, thus, a 
genuine competition and possible conflicting situations among all the possible 
communication targets that our “attention economy” has to continuously manage 
(Lanham, 2006) in order to advance individual fitness. Therefore, bonds compete with 
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each other for our attention, for the allocation of our limited communication time, and 
the signature of that competition appears in both the distribution of the number of 
bonds and in the distribution of talking times. The specific fieldwork supporting these 
relational distributions is described in (Marijuán et al., 2019). The competitive 
background and the Planckian fit are described in what follows. 
 
3. Competitive “Planckian” nature of the quantitative sociotype 
Two aspects of the sociotype results are relevant to our present concerns. First, the 
developmental or ontogenetic arch that can be appreciated in the age distribution of 
the sociotype results. And second, the competitive processes underlying the sociotype 
figures, which surface via the Planckian Distribution Equation. 
That there is an ontogenetic arch described by the sociotype along the development of 
the individual is not difficult to visualize (Berry and De Geest, 2012). It looms under our 
different tables and figures. We may observe the influence of age segments in the 
number of contacts, showing the sociotype ‘in the making’, in its temporal evolution 
from childhood and adolescence towards adulthood, maturity, elderhood, and 
senescence—all along the course of ontogenetic development. The figures 
corresponding to family, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances evolve differently 
along the successive age segments; and similarly the total sociotype contacts and 
talking times expand, stabilize, and finally tend to collapse—reminding the general 
developmental trajectory of all dissipative structures (Salthe, 2018). This ontogenetic 
arch described by the sociotype along the life cycle stages should approximately 
parallel the neural development of the individual. Culturally, these developmental 
stages are recognized in the form of different rites of passage (often reflected in 
formalities and celebrations) that ostensibly place the individual in a different stance in 
front of all his/her social contacts when completely new phases of life begin—e.g., 
graduation, marriage, retirement, etc. Particularly, the cultural imprinting received 
during youth and early adulthood, as we will discuss later, is crucial for the emergence 
of the generational phenomenon. This imprinting will accompany and orientate the 
behavior of the individual in a very clear and distinguishable way. Thereafter, along the 
life course of the individual, the sociotype will form a developmental arch punctuated 
by irregular variations and by clear discontinuities; perhaps configuring another 
Planckian curve analogous to those depicted below. 
Many considerations and influencing factors, such as personality type, gender, age, 
cultural background, socioeconomic conditions, etc., can be discussed in relation with 
the sociotype results (Marijuán et al., 2019). But, overall, like many other studies of 
social networks, they seem to be pointing at the emergence of a self-organizing 
landscape of social interrelationships grounded on competitive processes (Strogatz, 
2001; Barabási, 2003; Hollstein, 2011; Christakis and Fowler, 2018). There is external 
competition for personal attention between social agents as well as internal neuronal 
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competition amongst inner memories vying for re-expression of their own engram 
content. These two competitions, internal and external, in fact a single attentional one, 
would underlie the communication phenomena of our social world in all epochs—and 
not only in nowadays information society. 
As Lanham (2006) has posited, the “economics of attention” relates to the commodity 
in shortest supply in the present Age of Information: human attention itself. But herein 
we argue that such economics of attention would be inherent of all societies 
sufficiently complex, whenever the ‘natural size’ is achieved and the relational 
capability of the individual becomes overstretched. Insensibly, all our daily contacts 
and communicative interactions are caught within the general competition for 
attention. We optimize and we select with whom we want to talk and with whom we 
want to bond (or at least we try to do that). And we see our selections as spontaneous 
and natural within the different familiarity circles, paying differentiated attention 
along the specific valence and emotional overtones of the different relational domains. 
But the strength of some tight bonds does not mean that they are competition-free. 
For the sociotype is configured as an open and dynamic space, always involving a 
discrete – or not so discrete – exploration of new acquaintances, friendships, or even 
intimate partners. Old bonds may insensibly dissolve while new ones emerge. This 
extended competition for relational bonds configures an always changing scenario of 
social “partitions” that becomes a universal trait of human societies. Although it can be 
culturally modified and regimented in multiple ways, the competition is always there, 
providing each individual with relational potentialities for his/her social fitness 
leverage, for getting the own piece of the social tart. Nowadays it is easy to see this 
kind of extended competition as a characteristic of the virtual world or of the 
economic sphere, the latter apparently seen as the fundamental realm. But perhaps 
the opposite would be closer to the truth—the other competitive arenas would appear 
as derivatives of the fundamental one, the relational.  
Looking for formal approaches to the number of social contacts and the 
communication times in the sociotype results, a power law could be considered as the 
most cogent fit, as is usually claimed in the social networks field—see for instance the 
multidisciplinary compilation by G. West (2017). These laws would appropriately cover 
the falling phase of these long-tailed histograms, but would fare not so well in the 
rising phase. Conversely, the Planckian distribution equation (PDE) developed by S. Ji 
(2017) becomes a suitable fit. See Figure 1. We think that the fits we have obtained for 
the different communication histograms in that figure are due to an underlying 
panorama of scarce cognitive resources that are optimized in a relentless competition 
for attention.  
To reiterate, our social relationships mobilize an “attention economy” with 
mechanisms similar (actually prior) to our monetary economy and to other 
competitive domains, as already hinted by H. Simon (Simon, 1971; Gonçalves et al., 
2011) and by other relevant authors (Kahneman, 1973; Pashler, 1998; Dukas, 2004). 
9 
 
This is precisely the sense of the Planckian competitive ‘econophysics’ or optimizing 
selection processes amongst competing distribution possibilities, as highlighted by (Ji, 
2017), which is also present in a number of biological and social phenomena: protein 
folding, RNA metabolism, enzyme catalysis, T-cell receptor diversity, fMRI records, 
human decision making, econometric distributions, human communication, spoken 
and written language, etc. Derived from the resolution of the “econophysics” 
ultraviolet catastrophe, it represents the degree of organization (and hence of order) 
of a physical/biological/social system resulting from symmetry-breaking selection 
events applied to some randomly available (and hence symmetrically distributed) 
processes. In the case of social bonds, the randomness of possible interactions would 
be progressively selected and channeled into the different relational dynamic domains 




Figure 1: Graphical representation of the Planckian distribution equation (PDE) applied to the 
number of total contacts (a), and to the total face-to-face conversation time expressed in 
minutes daily (b). In both cases, the PDE was derived from the Planck's blackbody radiation 
formula by replacing its universal constants and temperature with three parameters, A, B and 
C, resulting in y = (A/(x + B)^5)/(Exp(C/(x + B)) -1), where x is the bin number of the histogram 
under analysis and y is the frequency. The numerical values of the PDE parameters were 
initially 'guessed' and the best-fitting parameter values were obtained using the Solver 
program in Excel. From (Marijuán et al., 2019), with permission. 
 
4. The decay of cultural items and the limits of cognition 
4.1. Universal patterns of decay 
In a recent approach, Candia et al. (2019) study the decay of attention and the 
collective memory in a variety of cultural products, using data on domains such as 
scientific publications, patents, songs, movies, and biographies. They test the 
hypothesis that the decay of the attention received by these cultural products involves 
interactions in two different domains: communicative memory and cultural memory. 
(b) Total face-to-face conversation (a) Total number of contacts   
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The former relates to oral exchanges and the latter to records on material supports, 
both maintaining an asymmetrical relationship—with a regular flow from the former 
towards the latter, say, from conversations towards the written stuff. Subsequently a 
mathematical model is built that predicts a biexponential decay function, which is 
statistically better than the exponential and log-normal functions used in the previous 
literature. Three parameters of the biexponential function would adjust to the 
different rhythms of decay of the different classes of cultural products. Their 
suggestion is that, across the different cultural domains, the model captures a 
“universal feature” of the decay of human collective memory.  
We argue that competition within an attention economy could be the underlying 
factor that manifests itself as a “universal feature”. This feature could be formally 
approachable via the biexponential functions developed by Candia et al. (2019), or 
alternatively via the PDE, which is also a biexponential function with three adjustable 
parameters as already noted in the quantitative sociotype’s distributions. 
The “attention economy” is also invoked in other recent approaches to scientific 
production metrics (Pan et al., 2018; Parolo et al, 2018). Interestingly, these authors 
assume a finite capacity for individual knowledge, and they see the functionality of the 
science citation network as an infrastructure supporting the collective memory of 
science (Pan et al., 2018, p. 656). Currently, the overstretching of cognitive limits for 
researchers’ attention and expertise would force them to adapt by narrowing their 
breadth (range of expertise at the knowledge frontier) and depth (sector area reaching 
deep knowledge). There would also appear other deleterious consequences related to 
the imbalance between production and consumption in current scientific research and 
in the related citation inflation (Parolo et al., 2018). In Figure 2 we can see a highly 
representative item of the decay of publications: the average citations that a scientific 
paper receives over time in two scientific domains—physics and biology. Certainly 
these figures can be compared with the sociotype curves approachrd by the PDE in 
Figure 1. To emphasize the clear rising phase of this type of curves, so problematic for 







Figure 2: Normalized number of citations per year received by papers in Physics and Biology 
after being published. Abscises represent the years passed. Normalization is done by dividing 
the number of citations by the peak value reached by the paper. For both disciplines, the 
averaged citation trajectories are calculated for papers in the top decile (top 10%) based on 
their total number of citations. Following (Parolo et al, 2018), modified, with permission.  
 
In sum, like in the sociotype itself, the “universal feature” of decay, either in the short 
term or in the long-term, either in science or in cultural realms, would result from the 
competition for individuals’ limited attention – and limited brain capabilities – by a 
multitude of alternative cultural products within an overall attention economy. In the 
general decay of cultural items, the interactions between the oral communicative stuff 
and the different classes of recorded stuff look so tight and so numerous that 
separating these two categories along the multiplicity of processes involved becomes 
arduous, if not futile. A continuous, unitary competitive phenomenon, related to the 
vagaries of individual cognition, looks more cogent in spite of the endless kinds of bias 
that may intervene—or precisely because of that very biasing multiplicity.  
4.2. Forgetfulness and the limits of individual cognition 
As stated, our argument on the “universal feature” focuses in the limited brain 
capability of each individual that fosters competitive processes—and forgetfulness. 
According to our discussion in Section 1, if sociality has been the great shaper of our 
brain growth, due to the management of social life within oversized groups finally 
limited by our cognitive capability, then the shared cultural repertoires effectively 
handled by individuals could hardly have an unlimited size. If natural social groups tend 
not to surpass 200 individuals (Dunbar’s number), and if languages tend to articulate a 
core of around 10,000 words, we have at least a little inkling on the limits of 
individual/social cognition—perhaps commensurate with the interactions of 100 x 100 
individuals? Echoing the “cognits” term proposed by J. Fuster (2003), these are 
understood as consistent items of knowledge about the world (both external and 
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internal and their interaction) formed by multiple elementary sensory-motor 
constellations of memory that together work efficiently in some specific context. 
Cognits are neither “memes” nor “concepts”; they are closer to “schemas” as they 
integrate observation, action, and thought; and they can also be combined, integrated 
into hierarchies, projected, associated, etc. What matters is the efficient cognitive 
guidance that they should provide to the behaving individual and that they could be 
actively shared in the cultural niche. Leaving aside the many complexities surrounding 
our memories (Schacter et al., 2012), the question would be: How many cognits can 
individuals retain? Or in other words: What could be the average of individual cognits 
within a particular cultural niche? The term personbyte (Hidalgo, 2015) has been 
proposed to represent the maximum of personal knowledge, the human carrying 
capacity. Thereupon, the social strategy to overcome that universal cognitive barrier 
would consist in chopping down the overall knowledge problems into separate 
fragments and reuniting/recombining them via continuous communication in social 
networks. The social process of knowledge compartmentalization into separate 
‘specialties’ and their multiple integration and recombination would be at the basis of 
all forms of social complexity. 
But a complementary aspect is that, with the passing of time, inactive cognits, or 
inactive cognit complexes, suffer the decay process, the ominous fall into oblivion. Far 
from being negative, forgetfulness for lack of use turns out to be a very convenient 
process, as it liberates mental space for new generalizations and for potential new 
comers. And the faster the arrival of such newcomers, the quicker will be the decay 
and oblivion. In that respect, Jorge Luis Borges’ character “Funes the memorious” 
(Funes el memorioso) achieves super-human powers of memory after an accident, but 
his world becomes one of intolerably uncountable details (Borges, 1944). Funes is 
incapable of crafting new ideas, generalities, or abstractions; his reasoning has become 
destroyed by his inability to forget (Quiroga, 2010): “To think is to ignore (or forget) 
differences, to generalize, to abstract. In the teeming world of Ireneo Funes there was 
nothing but particulars.” Borges was also linking forgetfulness to the general limits of 
memory. Seemingly he followed a classical estimate by G. Spiller (1902) on how many 
memories a person has from different stages in a lifetime: around 100 for the first 10 
years, 3,600 until 20 years, 2,000 more memories between the ages of 20 and 25, 
reaching about 10,000 different memories in the first 35 years of life (Quiroga, 2010). 
These figures, congruent with the growing number of contacts in individual 
development, remind the ontogenetic arch of the sociotype, and perhaps also remind 
the 100 x 100 order of magnitude of individual interactions in a stereotypical natural 
group. In any event, according to these views, could 10,000-20,000 different cognits be 
an educated guess on the limits that could be accessed by the average individual? 
Needless to say, these considerations on memory require the customary cum grano 
salis.  
In today’s complex societies, our cognizing limitations can be found almost 
everywhere: from specialized professions to the social division of work, from the usual 
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length of a book to the teaching contents of courses and programs, from the split of 
knowledge in separated disciplines to the branching of cultures and subcultures, from 
the information overload to the fantastic obsolescence of knowledge in this era. The 
limitation of knowledge appears at the root of all human behaviors. Unfortunately, 
new items are rather difficult to learn, but very easy to forget. Thus, as new items of 
knowledge and new social habits proliferate, “the battle for the cognits” becomes 
tougher and tougher. 
The case is that whatever one learns has to pass through the existing rhythms of 
neuronal reorganization, of synaptic weakening and reinforcement, of synaptic 
creation and destruction (an amazing role is played by microglia: Wang et al., 2020). 
Any new learning has to compete with other pieces of learning in order to establish a 
temporary presence within the cognitive reserve mostly associated by evolutionary 
design to our most important niche, the social world (Allman, 1999; Dunbar, 2004; 
Dehaene, 2009; Berthoz, 2012), what we call sociotype—the limited sociotype, 
actually. 
Thereupon, given the “conformity to peers” and the need to maintain social cohesion 
(Henrich, 2016), a brief glance on how collective dynamics of cultural change is 
superimposed upon the individual cognitive limitations becomes of utmost interest. In 
other words, how our powerful ontogenetic skills of social learning have been 
mastered – mobilized or immobilized – along the different epochs.  
4.3. The renewal of cultures 
In evolutionarily terms, stasis has marked the emerging cultures of our species during 
almost 99% of its existence. The survival of human groups was tied to very rigid social 
rules and slowly changing cultural products, and indeed it was so until the arrival of the 
Neolithic revolution. Once agrarian and husbandry production stabilized and cities 
could emerge (Diamond, 1997), cultures and civilizations broke with the immensely 
long period of stasis. Commerce, migrations, conquests, etc. lead to the historical 
interbreeding of cultures. The selection processes among competing ideas, products, 
customs, behaviors, etc. turned out to be more active and almost inevitable—and with 
them, the decay of outdated, discarded cultural products. 
From the historical perspective of ‘modernity’, we may see more pungently the 
competition argument. The secular influence of ancient written works, for instance, 
was suffering a moderate, almost negligible, decay during medieval centuries. They 
were the model to follow, the genuine paradigm of learning… until the diffusion of a 
flood of new ideas and new works throughout the printing press that dramatically 
altered the panorama of intellectuals’ attention –and of many other social agents 
(Hobart and Schiffman, 1998; Poe, 2011; Wootton, 2015). Particular historical factors 
were at play in the different cultural areas, encouraging or suffocating the 
consequences and possibilities of the new, ‘modern’ intellectual order generated via 
the printing press (Huff, 2011). But in the aggregate and in the long term, the historical 
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consequences of the continuous competition of ideas and new written works were 
momentous: geographic discoveries, religious crisis, scientific revolution, political 
revolution, industrial revolution... Generation after generation, Western societies were 
caught in a continuous process of reinventing themselves. 
That the renewal of societies along the ceaseless competition and universal decay of 
ideas, cultural products, material products, etc. could also be made “on a generational 
basis” represents an intriguing twist, an important additional factor to consider. If the 
subtle bonds emerging amongst people of a similar age turn out to be a relevant player 
in the dynamics of cultural change, the next question to examine in the present 
context is: What are “generations”? How do they play their influence in the decay and 
renewal of cultural items? 
 
5. The idea of generations 
Plutarch, in his biography of Lycurgus, cites three verses in which three generations of 
Spartans boast about their own might. The verses are supposed to be recited by each 
choir of warriors: 
The old ones: We have been very strong warriors. 
The young: We are: if you have won - look us in the face. 
The boys: But we will be much stronger still. 
The exchange appears in one of the emblematic texts of José Ortega y Gasset (1933) 
about the method of generations. Evidently, generations refer to the most 
fundamental fact of social life: birth and death, parents and children, life cycles in their 
continuity. Generations represent the different “ages of life” as separately grouped 
within the whole community. For the Ancients, life was composed of three ages: 
youth, adulthood, and senescence; or alternatively four: childhood, young adulthood, 
midlife, and old age. For Ortega y Gasset (1923, 1933), the usual interval in between 
parents and children, 30 years, becomes the basic generational granularity. 
Additionally, semi-generational periods or intervals of 15 years may appear either 
before and after the essential events or figures that mark the generation, or just at the 
middle of the whole period; they usually represent a distinguishable change of mood 
or cultural sensibility within the generation (forerunners vs. successors). The most 
formative period to internalize the new generational values and attitudes is 
adolescence; from 15 years old onwards there is a period of rejection of the traditional 
way of life and a frantic search of the new. The search culminates at the end of youth, 
from 25 to 30 years, when the individual starts his/her autonomous life project 
incorporating most of the new attitudes, cultural fashions, sexual mores, family ideals, 
political and societal values, etc.—the new life style that his/her generation purports.  
Historically, the most formative events for crafting the new spirit of a generation have 
been wars and liberation events, or social crisis of utmost severity (plagues, famines, 
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catastrophes…); or waves of prosperity and abundance; or the appearance of a 
towering leader; or the emergence of a fundamental means of communication (e.g., 
printing press, TV, Internet). Looking at the historical succession of generations, one of 
the most popular theories on generations (Howe and Strauss, 1991, 1997) postulates 
the emergence of a curious sequence of very different “social persona” embedded in 
the peculiar spirit of each generation, alternating the collective moods within a 
complete period of around 90 years. It is the saeculum, a secular oscillation that 
seemingly dominates most of Western history (focusing in the US and the UK data) so 
that cyclical periods of crisis, high, awakening, and unraveling can be neatly 
distinguished, and with them the predominance of the respective personality 
archetypes (idealist, reactive, civic, and adaptive). 
Influential works about the generational phenomenon are due to K. Mannheim (1928), 
J. Ortega y Gasset (1923, 1933), N. Howe and W. Strauss (1991, 1997), R. Putnam 
(2000), and many others. Although not strictly generational, the recent works by the 
Cliodynamics school of thought try to model the different cyclicities distinguishable 
within historical dynamics. Their models are based on combinations of a variety of 
data: historical, demographic, economic, political, cultural, technological, etc. (P. 
Turchin, A. Korotayev). One of their predictions is a severe instability peak in the 2020s 
due to declining well-being and elite overproduction and conflict (Turchin, 2016).   
As stated, generations cannot be fixed beforehand: they emerge with a variable 
periodicity and with a variable degree of differentiation. In this respect, an intriguing 
panorama can be described in today’s societies. According to US sources (Cagle, 2018), 
five generations would be currently active in that country: Generation Z (26% 
population, born in between 2000-2018), Millenials (22% pop., b. 1976-1990), 
Generation X (21% pop., b. 1964-1982), Baby Boomers (25% pop., b. 1945-1963), Silent 
Generation (3% pop., b. 1926-1944). We may consider that most Boomers have already 
been replaced from power by the Xers, that the Millenials are actively engaged in their 
ascension, and that the Zers are just new comers to the social arena. To note that most 
of these recent generations have been attributed shorter durations, around 20 years 
each or less (so, closer to Ortega’s semi-generations), while historical generations of 
previous centuries were closer to 30 years.  
From the point of view of the limited sociotype, the continuous mixing of generations 
is highly consequential. If we tried to identify the generational origin of the active 
cognits present in an individual, we would find, quite probably, a dense mixing. The 
main content would be biased towards the peers, of course, as peers, i.e. the closest 
individuals of the generational cohort (friends and colleagues in the sociotype 
dimensions), are clearly recognized by social psychologists as the main force driving 
the development of personality and life style (Pinker, 2009). But this would be 
accompanied by a series of decreasing influences from the preceding generations—in 
a nuanced degradation of the past. The non obvious point about that mixing is that the 
hypothetical stock of cognits available to the educated individual has to be adaptive, 
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efficiently linking to the existing social milieu. And this has to include not only the 
traditional contents of culture, but also the navigation in economic, educational, 
professional, technological, political, urban and –nowadays– digital spaces. What 
consequences may imply the overabundance of specialized new cognits regarding the 
maintenance and decay of cultural items? 
 
6. As the economy grows… 
Fundamental economic factors have been often cited as the main movers of social 
evolution. The extent to which they directly contribute to accelerate the rhythms of 
replacement and decay of cultural items – becoming a proxy for intergenerational 
change – is an essential part of our argument.  
For simplification, if we consider the ‘natural’ interval of 30 years for the successive 
generations, there is a striking fact to observe (partially commented in 4.3): that the 
deepest cultural and social changes occupy a tiny interval of less than 10 generations—
from the onset of the industrial revolution to our times. Previously, there is another 
set of about 10 generations, from the Era of Discovery until the industrial revolution, in 
which the revolutionary intellectual order promoted by the printing press was 
developed (Wootton, 2015). And historically, there were around 400 previous 
generations, starting with the “Severing” age (Morton, 2017), that had passed with a 
comparatively modest although crucial legacy of civilization tools that were separating 
us from nature—plus another 10,000 human generations that had lived in an almost 
complete cultural stasis. 
Then, after the onset of the industrial revolution something enthralling, really 
extraordinary, occurs. Approximately, with every passing generation the existing 
wealth increases systematically, almost geometrically (Landes, 1998; Pinker, 2018, 
Rosling et al., 2018). On average, every 30 years the whole wealth of the countries 
following the pathways of industrialization was increased at least by 50% —and in 
many periods above 100% or far more. We will see the economic data later. But that 
systematic growth means not only an enormous increase of wealth during the 
successive industrial revolutions; it also means the approximate duplication on a 
generational basis of other crucial correlates. We can witness the near doubling of 
strategic items such as: the number of engineering and technological inventions 
(Hughes, 2004; Arthur, 2009, Poe, 2011), the number of working scientists and 
engineers (Landes, 1998), the number of research fields (Marijuán et al., 2012), the 
inflation of scientific publications (Feist, 2006; Pan et al., 2018)), the global energy 
consumption (Smil, 2017; Rhodes, 2018), the population living in cities (Batty, 2013; 
Rhodes, 2018), and probably the same goes for buildings, factories, roads, 
infrastructures, civil servants, administration, sanitary and education personnel, and so 
on and so forth. In each generation, it is an entire world anew! 
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Formally, it can be argued that with the “Era of Discovery” some Western societies 
started a new, enhanced process of combinatorics of ideas. And that after 10 
generations or so, the enhanced combinatorics finally percolated into the world of 
products and services. A threshold was crossed, then, regarding the “adjacent 
possible” (Kauffman, 2019) and an exponential course was initiated for the most 
essential aspects of economic and social life. See Figure 3, which reflects the global 
pace of economic development (world growth rate) during the last two millennia. Until 
circa 1700, there is no appreciable growth, with rates close to 0 or negative, or 0.5% in 
some rare positive peak. Clearly after 1800, growth rates steadily escalate and they 
achieve about 1900 the rate of 2.34 % that implies a complete intergenerational 
doubling of global wealth. 
                                           
 
Figure 3: Estimated annual growth rate for the whole world economy, over the last two 
thousand years. The data presented from 1990 onwards are from the World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD (accessed on April 16, 2017). Data 
earlier than 1990 are based on the growth rates implied by Maddison data. They are published 
in https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/ (accessed April 2020).  
 
The argument deserves more discussion—and data. In Table 1 we have put the 
economic achievement of different countries, the GDP ppp figures (gross domestic 
product in purchase power parity, expressed in international $ of 2011) every 30 years, 
and in Table 2 we have calculated the corresponding growth rates for the same 
intervals. After the continuous stagnation of all the previous centuries, we observe in 
the period 1810-1840 a fast intergenerational growth above 50% for the UK, Germany 
and the USA, the latter with an amazing 180%; these are the early birds of industrial 
revolution, followed in the next period by France and Russia, and later on by Japan, 
Italy, and Spain. In the case of China and India, they achieved the growth rhythms of 
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the industrial revolution only well into the 20th Century and in the recent decades, 
when these two countries have reached fantastic intergenerational rates in the order 
of 1000% and 500% respectively. The case of Spain, with more than 400% of 
intergenerational growth in late 20th Century is also remarkable. Russia (during the 
USSR period) achieved close to a good 300%. This country, Italy and Japan have 
comparatively faltered during the last period analyzed (1990-2018). 
 
Table 1: GDP (ppp) per country during 1810-2018, every 30 years* 
GDP (ppp) in Millions international $ 
Country/Year 1810 1840 1870 1900 1930 1960 1990 2018 
CHINA 342,317 404891 401,861 353065 515,817 603,134 1,760,886 22,566,550 
USA  18,037 50,698 166,054 519,234 1,352,226 3,335,472 9,306,061 17,909,532 
INDIA 180,384 198,801 225,103 286,928 354,887 442,379 1,499,808  9,136,965 
JAPAN 32,520 35,076 41,982 79,066 175,673 430,222 3,717,842 4,969,486 
GERMANY 41,564 64,695 112,006 246,827 454,049 1,044,079 2,505,592 3,712,598 
RUSSIA 44,930 61,816 99,351 201,937 315,363 1,255,083 3,071,063 3,563,805 
UK 47,339 83,927 165,372 304,738 404,222 707,098 1,526,097 2,663,825 
FRANCE 55,049 72,967 126,807 173,400 289,619 515,805 1,667,824 2,541,113 
ITALY 49,440 56,704 72,668 116,443 236,555 499,499 1,766,399 2,085,390 
SPAIN 17,989 22,161 29,618 50,082 104,189 173,350    919,508 1,609,048 
 
(*) The Gross Domestic Product by purchasing power parity (PPP) attends to the currencies' respective 
purchasing power, expressed in 2011 international $. All these data have been extracted by the authors 
from the chart animation in: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-2nqd6-ZXg). Source: The Angus 
Maddison Project & World Bank, https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/maddison-
project-board (accessed April 2020). 
 
Table 2: Variation rate of GDP (ppp) per country during 1810-2018, every 30 years* 
GDP Growth (annual %) 
Country/Year 














TOTAL   
1840-2018 
CHINA 18.28 -0.75 -12.14 46.10 16.93 191.96 1,181.55 1,441.91 
USA 181.08 227.54 212.69 160.43 146.67 179.00 92.45 1,199.85 
INDIA 10.21 13.23 27.47 23.69 24.65 239.03 509.21     847.49 
JAPAN  7.86 19.69 88.33 122.19 144.90 764.17 33.67 1,180.80 
GERMANY 55.65 73.13 120.37 83.95 129.95 139.98 48.17     651.21 
RUSSIA 37.58 60.72 103.26 56.17 297.98 144.69 16.04     716.44 
UK 77.29 97.04 84.27 32.65 74.93 115.83 74.55     556.56 
FRANCE 32.55 73.79 36.74 67.02 78.10 223.34 52.36     563.91 
ITALY 14.69 28.15 60.24 103.15 111.16 253.63 18.06     589.08 




(*)  All these rates have been calculated by the authors from the figures of Table 1. Source: The Angus 
Maddison Project & World Bank, https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/maddison-
project-board (accessed April 2020). 
 
The whole data of Table 1 and 2 could tell quite many stories about the struggle for 
world power and the geopolitical commotions occurred during the last two centuries. 
The expansion of the industrial revolution was far from smooth, as it was accompanied 
by deep social conflicts, political upheavals, and imperialistic confrontations (Ferguson, 
2017; Rhodes, 2018); it emanated from the UK plus a few pioneering countries, those 
cited with the higher initial growth rates, and progressively arrived to more and more 
countries. Later on, the cornucopia of new technologies and products from the second 
and third industrial revolutions multiplied the whole combinatory effect of the 
“adjacent possible”. And there emerged: electricity, combustion engines, cars, 
aviation, electronics, communication, computers, and a great improvement in 
sanitation and general health. This powerful set made possible the onset of the 
present globalization period and the extension of the modern economies and the new 
ways of life – in just a couple of generations – to almost every country and every 
continent of the globe. The sheer contrast with the stagnation of previous centuries is 
almost unimaginable.  
 
7. As the economy grows… the past recedes  
As the economy has fantastically expanded, what has happened with the world of 
culture, with the permanence and decay of cultural items and ways of life? 
Looking in generational terms, the steady economic accumulation we are referring 
could be seen as if every successive generation had been able to build by itself a new 
material world of paramount size – often bigger – than the received one from the 
previous generation. Two physical worlds factically amalgamated into one: the old and 
the new coexisting, but with a competitive advantage for the latter. And this 
presumably has occurred in every relevant sense, including the world of culture and 
multiple aspects of social life. It has not been due merely to the material goods and the 
global wealth created. The biggest impact corresponds to technologies. As we create 
them, they change our lives in far more senses than we think.  
The successive waves of technological inventions have inexorably changed social 
customs, ways of life, uses of time, and the different habits and pieces of learning 
necessary to navigate in economic, technical, educational, professional, recreational, 
legal, political, urban and –nowadays– digital spaces. All of them have been utterly 
changed. And with the successive waves of change, the steady maintenance of culture 
as seen in previous centuries has faltered, and even collapsed. 
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Thereafter, as our argument goes, with each passing generation the available cognit 
space to be shared in the mixing with the legacy of the previous generation has 
continued to be basically the same; and this has forced a substantial loss of that very 
legacy. It means that if the emerging youth culture has become very dissimilar, bluntly 
imprinted by the surge of physical and mental novelties invading most corners of life, 
the mixing will be highly asymmetric, and far from keeping a balance with the legacy of 
the main competing generation. An important part of the accumulated legacy will 
become inactive, then, relegated to relatively inane written records or visual archives, 
and far from having a vital influence in social customs. Reminding what Figure 2 was 
telling about the decay of scientific citations, those relegated items would be pushed 
towards the extreme in the long-tail of the curve. The ascending part of the curve will 
now be occupied by the fashionable new comers. 
Thus, as industrial and postindustrial economies have imperviously grown, with their 
mounting retinue of cognitive, technical, material, and entertainment loads, the past 
has systematically receded at a similar speed. The fraction of the past which is 
effective, that can be seen as “vigente”, as active or valid, has diminished 
dramatically—close to being systematically halved with every passing generation. 
According to a recent empirical quest (Liu, 2019), the living memory of contemporary 
society would be anchored to foundational events spanning a few generations—just 
three. As the economy grows, the fraction of the past which is effectively kept in mind 
recedes. 
Which fractions of culture have been most affected by this generational decimation, by 
the approximate cutting in half of the intergenerational legacy? Possibly, the most 
salient fact of the last two centuries – apart of the revolution in science and technology 
– was the development of completely new ways of thinking and the exacerbation of 
social unrest. In fact, the new age of industrialism and social upheavals revolutionized 
all forms of cultural and social narratives—of storytelling. It was felt paradigmatically in 
novels, drama, opera, painting, cinema, music, and in all ways of entertainment 
(Booker, 2004). The changes in music, for instance, during last generations are 
enthralling (Benzon, 2001). Literature itself becomes a most revealing guide. In spite of 
their huge thematic diversity, Charles Dickens, Herman Melville, Thomas Hardy, 
Honoré Balzac, Emile Zola, Benito Pérez Galdós, Pío Baroja, and a number of other 
great novelists, would show a curious new trait. In many of their works they could not 
help but complain: for the fast disappearance of their own times; for the loss of their 
favorite cafes, theaters, and places; for the unstoppable “progress” and massification 
of their cities; for the advent of new impersonal and impolite styles; for the awful new 
fashions and tastes; for the ignorance and barbarianism of the young colleagues… 
Perhaps the most important novel of the 20th Century, “A la recherche du temps 
perdu,” of Marcel Proust, is an eloquent telling on the physical disappearance of the 
nobiliary and aristocratic world, replaced by a new business world congested of 
popularized inventions —trains, bicycles, cars, planes, etc. Along this much extended 
novel, the melancholy and remembrance of a luminous past in the first volumes gives 
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way to the amazing kineticism and destructuring of the last volumes, immersed in a 
new kind of life that the author ostensibly detests. A similar attitude transpires in the 
pungent criticisms and complaints of “The revolt of the masses” (La rebelión de las 
masas) from Ortega y Gasset (1929). Actually, this generalized sense of too fast change 
and disappearance was unseen in preindustrial centuries, when generations were 
following each other within similar economic and cultural frameworks and only 
separated by the emerging secular oscillations of collective personalities. The sense of 
loss continues to eloquently resonate in our own times: “for a few short, dreamy years 
I was given a glimpse of a lost past, just before it vanished forever. And from then on I 
knew what I liked.” (Hitchens, 2019). 
 
8. The Fourth Industrial Revolution 
An obvious continuation of the above is that along the periods of slow social change 
distinguishing between generations is difficult. Conversely, when social change is very 
fast, differences between generations are magnified (Kortti, 2011). Precisely we have 
called ‘revolutionary’ to those periods of economic and social upheaval when cultures 
and traditions are radically changed. About the so called “Fourth Industrial 
Revolution”, according to the proposer of the term (Schwab, 2015), it is a new era of 
machine and human augmentation and integration that represents a most 
fundamental change in the way individuals are living, working, and relating to each 
other. Enabled by its extraordinary technological advances, the new period would be 
commensurate with the first, second, and third industrial revolutions. 
But following the proxy that each wealth-amplifying generation cuts a similar portion 
out from the cultural legacy of the antecedent generation, which contains in itself the 
whole decimated legacies of the previous generations, what would happen when the 
actual wealth has been more than doubled? Because that seems to be the aggregate 
economic success of the past 30 + 30 years (see discussions on world progress in 
Rosling et al., 2018, Pinker 2018). The fact is that beyond a sustained growth rate of 
2,34%, as we have already stated, the GDP is doubled every 30 years or so. And Figure 
4 shows that this has been the case of the world growth rates during the last 60 years. 
But there is an important difference between the two periods contained in the figure. 
In the first period (from 1960 to 1990), growth was concentrated in countries such as 
Japan, Spain, Italy, France (plus Korea, Brazil, Mexico…), while in the second period 
most of the world growth has been concentrated in the two most populated countries: 
China and India (with breathtaking figures of 1.100 % and 500 % respectively), with 
only a moderate growth in the previously industrialized countries. See Figure 4 below, 






Figure 4: World GDP rate growth from 1960 to 2018. Source: The World Bank Data. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg (accessed April 2020). 
 
This is the amazing “globalization” phenomenon that started in the 1990s. But more 
important than the doubled GDP on a world scale is the powerful cultural punch of this 
economic boom. Cultural change has been amplified by the appearance of radically 
new communication media (Poe, 2011): computers, Internet, mobiles, social networks; 
with the addition of bioinformatics, robotics, and artificial intelligence. The overall 
result is that, probably, there has never been a comparable cultural change in history.  
Too many new pieces of learning have been required; too many new automatisms 
have been learned and imprinted upon the new generation(s) involved. Indeed, the 
new habits and automatisms have provided unprecedented individual and social 
capabilities. Echoing Whitehead (1911, p. 42): “Civilization advances by extending the 
number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them.” 
But the other side of the coin is that these new automatisms are taking their cognitive 
toll. Socially, we can only arrange the extra cognits necessary by means of enhanced 
forgetting. It is to say: “civilizations evolve through strategic forgetting of what were 
once considered vital life skills” (Tracy, 2019). And among these vital life skills, the first 
wave of casualties of forgetfulness occurs in the world of culture, in the legacy of 
traditions, stories, rules, and wisdoms linking the individual to the social collective.  
In our times, the overwhelming arrival of new cultural items and the parallel 
acceleration of biased forgetfulness have reached fundamental strata of the collective 
identity—those which all education systems, religions, nations, and ideologies hardly 
struggle to maintain unchanged along time. Without any outstanding conflict, crucial 
traits of the shared past have been lost or relegated, and a fundamental cultural 
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disorientation has grown in both the ascending generation and the descending one. 
Traditional gatekeepers of the social information flows have been downsized if not 
eliminated; traditional intermediary economic structures have been disintegrated; the 
whole distribution of wealth has been dramatically altered; and the mounting 
ecological-climatic crisis has added a context of urgency and dramatism. Thereafter, 
the intergenerational gap in terms of economic change, technological change, cultural 
change, and communication change has never been so wide, and has far exceeded the 
potential for a balanced, approximately symmetric generational mixing. No wonder 
that disinformation, polarization, discord, social unrest, and turmoil are on the rise—
tightly accompanied and stimulated by a formidable ignorance of the own cultural 
past. 
There is another class of important consequences: the loss of face-to-face relations. It 
is the “bowling alone” phenomenon that was already detected by R. Putnam (2000). 
Technological surrogates are increasingly substituting for face-to-face relationships 
and social bonding structures (Turkley, 2011, 2015); nowadays the disruptions of 
algorithmic-decision systems are steadily advancing and touching every corner of our 
daily lives: shopping, communication, social networks, newsfeeds, travel & 
transportation, commercial advertising, medical treatments, loans and mortages, 
insurance policing, bail and parole, and soon even self-driving cars (Benkler, 2019). 
New machines, new ways of thought, and new ways of (more isolated) life… The 
extent to which the accelerated rhythms of technological and cultural change have 
also affected the inner rhythms of reflection, the substance and style of intellectual 
production, is hard to gauge (Lefebvre, 2017)—time will tell. Emotionally, an amazing 
prevalence of information-related disorders seems to be affecting individuals in the 
Information Society: epidemic of loneliness, depression, stress, collapse of ‘real’ 
sociotypes, etc. Depression is now the leading cause of disability worldwide (WHO, 
2020), and mental illness accounts for up to 40% years lost to disability (Marijuán and 
Navarro, 2018). Another insidious epidemics, of obesity, is on the rise, coupled with an 
alarming growth of non-communicable diseases, prescription-drugs abuse (opioids, 
painkillers, and anti-inflammatories), plus widespread adolescent medicalization. Could 
it be related to the fact that adolescents are “almost constantly” in front of their cell 
phones screens? (Abi-Jaoude et al., 2010; Mak et al., 2014; Pipher and Gilliam, 2019). 
And to the fact that American adults spend at work and at home more than 11 hours 
per day – most of their waking hours – staring at screens in working, reading, 
watching, listening to or simply interacting with media? (Fottrell, 2018). Nevertheless, 
as happens when scientific research impinges on the vested interests of powerful 
industries and companies (Michaels, 2020), scientific opinions are apparently divided 
about the consequences of those new habits (Reeves et al., 2020). 
In spite of the bounty of new products, inventions, and cultural creations, the previous 
industrial revolutions could not help but being involved in unrest and confrontation 
caused by the insidious growth of social imbalances. The thrilling technological and 
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cultural acceleration of our times, which is full of unintended consequences, probably 
cannot escape that fate. For some, ours is indeed becoming “The Age of Discords” 
(Turchin, 2016).  
 
8. Concluding comments 
It has been a dense conceptual excursion. From the sociotype term, a new construct 
that attempts the qualitative and quantitative description of the social niches to which 
humans are adapted, we have jumped to the attention economy present in our social 
interactions, to the competition underlying the decay of cultural items, to the 
emergence of the generational phenomenon, to the economic proxy of cultural 
change, and finally to the consequences of the explosive growth of industrial 
revolutions. 
Although in the reporting of some sections the sociotype has apparently ended to be 
submerged to the subliminal, we should remind that the economy of attention is an 
outcome of the limited communication capabilities and the limited sociotype itself, 
that the necessary forgetfulness is also a children of our cognitive limitations, that 
culturally differentiated generations emerge due to the juvenile imprinting upon 
individuals caused mainly by two dimensions of their sociotype—friends and 
colleagues. Or that the very cognizing limits implied by the sociotype ultimately 
provoke the decimation of the received cultural items via myriad of individual 
preferences, biased choices, and involuntary actions. Indeed the sociotype 
characteristics have cast a long shadow on our cultural evolution. Nevertheless, the 
authors are aware that many of the assumptions are still speculative and would 
demand more careful a discussion than what is possible in the present work. Perhaps 
putting the central points in a condensed hypothetical form could help further 
discussion and stimulate comprobation—or rejection.  
1. The genotype-phenotype-sociotype conceptual triad. It indicates that our main 
evolutionary adaptation is to our species-typical social niche. The sociotype would 
form part of our own nature, with social bonds and ‘languaging’ as its central aspects. 
The approximate number of bonds (in different domains: family, friends, colleagues, 
acquaintances) and the corresponding amount of talking time become fundamental 
quantitative traits. Regularities such as the Dunbar number suggest the existence of a 
bonding average widely shared, implying the presence of cognitive constraints that 
limit the indefinite extension of the sociotype. Conversely, social isolation, the lack of 
social bonds and of a minimum daily conversation, represents one the most important 
risk factors for mental health and physical health. 
2. Inherent competitive nature of social communicative interrelationships. The clear 
constraints in the sociotype quantitative distributions, to which the “econophysics” of 
the Planckian Distribution Equation (PDE) may be applied, represent an extra 
argument for considering our communicative interactions as immersed in an 
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“attention economy”. This seems to widely apply to the world of culture as well. 
Current approaches to the decay of scientific and cultural items are pointing in a 
similar direction, and this suggests that there might be a universal law of decay 
presumably based on a generalized competition stemming from the optimization of 
individual cognitive resources. The limited sociotype, actually our most important 
cognitive reserve, symbolizes the extent of such individual limitation. 
3. Cognitive limitation and forgetfulness underlie cultural dynamics. Maintenance, 
decay, and replacement of cultural items are necessarily linked to forgetfulness and to 
the limited cognitive capability of individuals. As intuited by J.L. Borges (1944), there 
cannot be an unlimited capability for individual memory. The term cognit, crafted by J. 
Fuster (2003), is proposed in order to visualize an order of magnitude for such 
individual capability. What could be the average global cognits maintained by an 
educated individual? What kinds of cognits are needed to navigate in a cultural niche, 
or to follow a particular way of life? How could this cognitive limitation relate to the 
evolution and renewal of cultures? 
4. Emergence of differentiated generations. The historical differentiation of 
generations ultimately relates to the imprinting of values, tastes, and styles of thinking 
taking place during youth and early adulthood along the ontogenetic development of 
the individual. Mostly produced out from two basic relational dimensions of the 
sociotype – friends and colleagues – this imprinting introduces a strong bias in the 
maintenance, decay, and replacement of cultural items. Each cohort would be 
attracted towards the new vision, tastes, and fashions upheld by the own generation.  
5. A new, astonishing fact in the succession of generations. With the industrial 
revolution, a threshold was crossed regarding the “adjacent possible” and an 
exponential course was ignited for the economy, creating a higher number of new 
material and mental structures that have continued multiplying on an exponential 
basis. Each passing generation has been able to substantially and systematically 
increase the whole contents of its material world, adding up an entire new world to 
the received one. But the sheer amount of new habits necessary for social life in 
industrial and postindustrial societies has forced individuals to generationally absorb 
an almost duplicate amount of cultural presences, of cognits, in their inner mental 
spaces.  
6. As the economy grows, the past recedes. The decay of cultural elements has been 
accelerated, and biased, with preference for much faster discarding the items of the 
previous generations, the contents of the received world. Factually, “doubling 
generations” become “halving generations,” systematically pruning the previous 
cultural legacy which already contains in itself the remains of previously decimated 
legacies. Like competing for writing on a vanishing palimpsest: each ascending 
generation brings its own new contents and relegates more and more of the distant 
past to oblivion, to increasingly outdated text books, archives, museums, etc. “As the 
economy grows, the past recedes”.  
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And finally, along the Fourth Industrial Revolution – the so called Information Age – 
the GDP has been doubling on a global word scale, and far more than tripling in some 
countries. And this is compounded with dramatic changes in new communication 
media and new interconnected systems of worldwide extension. What are the 
consequences? Let us leave this as an open question—only stating the formidable 
ignorance of the own cultural past in the ascending generations. 
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